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Abstract Cogito-like judgments, a term coined by Burge (1988), comprise thoughts
such as, I am now thinking, I [hereby] judge that Los Angeles is at the same latitude as
North Africa, or I [hereby] intend to go to the opera tonight. It is widely accepted that
we form cogito-like judgments in an authoritative and not merely empirical manner.
We have privileged self-knowledge of the mental state that is self-ascribed in a cogito-
like judgment. Thus, models of self-knowledge that aim to explain privileged self-
knowledge should have the resources to explain the special self-knowledge involved
in cogito judgments. My objective in this paper is to examine whether a transparency
model of self-knowledge (i.e.,models based onEvans’ 1982 remarks) can provide such
an explanation: granted that cogito judgments are paradigmatic cases of privileged
self-knowledge, does the transparency procedure explain why this is so? The paper
advances a negative answer, arguing that the transparency procedure cannot generate
the type of thought constitutive of cogito judgments.








According to Burge (1988, 2011), cogito-like judgments (hereafter ‘cogito judgments’
for short), are paradigmatic examples of self-knowledge acquired in a direct, authorita-
tive, and not merely empirical manner. Examples of this type of mental self-ascription
include, I am now thinking, I [hereby] judge that Los Angeles is at the same latitude
as North Africa, or, I [hereby] intend to go to the opera tonight.1 Despite disagree-
ments about their specific epistemic traits, it is widely accepted that, if we have
privileged self-knowledge at all—i.e., knowledge of one’s own mental states that is
epistemically different from and superior to the knowledge of others’ mental states—,
cogito judgments are prime examples.2
One model of self-knowledge that is extensively discussed in recent years is the
transparency model. Transparency models are based on Evans’ (1982) remarks sug-
gesting that an explanation of self-knowledge is to be found in relation to the so-called
transparency procedure—i.e., answering the question whether we believe that p by
answering the question whether p. Transparency models of self-knowledge hold that
instances of privileged self-knowledge are formed (or achieved) by the application of
the transparency procedure.
The guiding question of this paper is the following: granted that cogito judgments
are paradigmatic cases of privileged self-knowledge, does the transparency procedure
provide an explanation of why this is so?3 The compatibilist debate between anti-
individualism and self-knowledge during the late eighties and nineties discussed cogito
1 I am following Burge’s notation according to which the underline indicates thoughts’ contents.
2 My characterization of the notion ‘privileged self-knowledge’ is deliberately general to be compatible
with anymodel of self-knowledge that holds there is something epistemically special about self-knowledge.
Although Burge himself does not use the term ‘privileged self-knowledge’, he understands that self-
knowledge is special to the extent that it is direct, authoritative, and not merely empirical knowledge.
Other models differ on the particular features of privileged self-knowledge. For example, an observational
model holds that self-knowledge is privileged due to the privileged access to our minds via inner sense. In
one version of the model, inner sense is a direct, complete and infallible mechanism of knowledge acquisi-
tion (Russell 1912). In another version, inner sense is rather strongly analogous to outer senses, and thus,
it is not infallible. But it is still a privileged mechanism: other people do not have an ‘internal monitor or
scanner’ of our minds (Armstrong 1968; Lycan 1996). In contrast, a constitutivist model rejects the idea that
self-knowledge is achieved by a cognitive process that ‘discovers’ inner items. It actually denies that there
are inner items to be discovered. Instead, constitutivism holds that we have privileged self-knowledge—
i.e., authoritative self-knowledge—because we constitute our mental states when they are self-attributed
(Wright 1989, 1998). Expressivism also denies the idea that self-knowledge is special because we have
special access to inner mental items. However, in contrast to constitutivism, expressivism holds that the
special aspect of self-knowledge relates to the fact that only the individual herself is in the position to
express her mind, which confers her with first-person authority (Bar-On 2004; Finkelstein 2008). I explain
transparency models in Sect. 3, in particular the versions advanced by Byrne—who understands privileged
self-knowledge in terms of privileged and peculiar access—and Moran—who understands privileged self-
knowledge in terms of deliberation. For a comprehensive guide to different models of self-knowledge see
Gertler (2011a). For skeptical voices about privileged self-knowledge in general, and about substantial
self-knowledge, see respectively Schwitzgebel (2012) and Cassam (2014).
3 Given the paper’s objective, I take for granted the idea that we have privileged self-knowledge of cogito
judgments. In any case, to the best of my knowledge, there is no position which accepts that many of our




judgments extensively. However, the subsequent debate that centered exclusively on
self-knowledge has shifted its attention to other types of second-order judgments,
such as self-ascriptions of standing beliefs. Whether transparency models explain
how cogito judgments are instances of privileged self-knowledge remains an open
question.
The paper develops as follows. Section 2 explains Burge’s notion of cogito judg-
ments and identifies the main psychological characteristics of this type of thought.
Section 3 explains the core claims of transparency accounts of self-knowledge and
discusses the first set of criticisms of such accounts. Section 4 advances the main
criticism of transparency models: namely, that the application of the transparency pro-
cedure does not produce cogito judgments. Since transparency models aim to explain
privileged self-knowledge by explaining how the correspondent mental self-ascription
is formed via the transparency procedure, I conclude that such models fail to explain
how cogito judgments stand as privileged self-knowledge. Section 5 summarizes the
paper’s arguments and briefly discusses their scope of application.
2 Cogito judgments
Burge has coined the term ‘cogito judgments’ after Descartes’ cogito (I am now
thinking) to refer to a particular class of second-order judgments that represent what he
then called ‘basic self-knowledge’. When he first discussed such a class of thoughts in
his (1988), Burge’s objective was to argue that anti-individualism is compatible with
privileged self-knowledge.4 Burge has advanced an explanation of why we have priv-
ileged self-knowledge of cogito judgments in later works (see for example his 2011).
For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to discuss whether Burge’s view
on compatibilism has succeeded, nor is it required to agree with Burge’s explanation
of self-knowledge.5 What matters for this paper is the nature of those thoughts that
Burge individuated when he termed the notion cogito judgments. I explore the nature
of such thoughts in the remainder of this section.
Let us start with a few examples. Consider the following thoughts:
(1): I am thinking.
(2): I [hereby] judge that there will be no third world war.
4 Very roughly, his argument can be reformulated as follows. Knowledge of cogito judgments represents
a paradigmatic case of privileged self-knowledge (i.e., basic self-knowledge). Cogito-judgments are self-
verifyingdue to their self-reflexive form.Thus, the fact that the contents of one’s own thoughts are determined
by factors external to the individual does not preclude the individual from having privileged self-knowledge
of their cogito-judgments. In fact, being in a position to form such thoughts is evidence that the world has
contributed to the formation of the person’s mind. Burge’s paper (1988) launched the so-called compatibilist
debate between anti-individualism and self-knowledge.
5 See Ludlow and Martin (1998) for a good selection of early essays belonging to the compatibilist
debate. A further question that goes beyond the scope of this paper is about the accuracy of Burge’s own
characterization of cogito judgments. Since there is no established debate about this question, the paper
relies on Burge’s account of this type of thought, which will be reconstructed throughout this section. Burge
not only has coined the term, but he is also one of the few philosophers who dedicate a central place for
cogito judgments within his general view of self-knowledge.
123
Synthese
Thought (1) is Descartes’ cogito. Thoughts like (2) have many similarities to thought
(1), and thus can legitimately be called ‘cogito-like judgments’ (see Burge 1988). Both
thoughts (1) and (2) present the following specific characteristics: (i) they are a type of
judgment: they are occurrent thoughts with associated truth conditions; and (ii) they
are a type of mental self-ascription: when making the judgment, the individual self-
ascribes a mental predicate of a particular type, namely, a mental occurrence of the
individual who makes the judgment. Trait (ii) is particularly important to distinguish
proper cases of cogito judgments from other types of mental self-ascription that are
not cogito judgments, such as the following thought:
(3): I believe that there will be no third world war.
Thought (3) is a judgment by which the individual self-ascribes a mental predicate.
However, assuming that thought (3) self-ascribes a standing belief, it does not display
features (ii). The subject matter of (3) is a mental state of the individual who makes
the judgment. However, according to feature (ii), a cogito judgment is about a mental
occurrence taking place while the individual performs the judgment. Being about
one’s own mental states is not sufficient to satisfy trait (ii). Cogito judgments concern
present occurrences (Burge 2011, p. 209).6
According to Sawyer (2002), failure to see why thought (3) is not a cogito judgment
is the basis of many misplaced criticisms of Burge’s compatibilist thesis.7 She presses
on this issue in her defense of Burge’s views:
what distinguishes the cogito-like self-attributions from the non-cogito-like self-
attributions is that in the latter case there are two distinct mental states—one
standing, and the other occurrent. The cogito-like self-attributions, in contrast,
are such that the first-order thought and the second-order judgment occur in the
same mental act. (Sawyer 2002, p. 123)
As Sawyer highlights, the fact that a given mental self-attribution has two indepen-
dent components shows that it is a not cogito judgment. Thought (3), for instance, is
composed by both the mental act of judging that one believes p, and the belief state
itself. However, a mental self-ascription composed by two occurrent mental states—as
opposed to one occurrent and another standing—does not guarantee it to be a cogito
judgment. Because both mental occurrences might be independently thought, they
might not be part of the same mental act. Traits (i) and (ii) are insufficient to identify
a cogito judgment. Consider the following case:
Imagine that someone, let’s say Paul, suddenly pays attention to his own reflection
in themirror. Based on the perception of his expressions of consternation, and knowing
6 According to Burge, mental self-ascriptions that are not cogito judgments (for example,
I believe that Paris is the capital of France) are by far the more common case. They also can amount to
authoritative and privileged self-knowledge. However, non-cogito self-attributions are a different type of
thought when compared to cogito judgments. Although instances of both can amount to privileged self-
knowledge, cogito judgments seem to exhibit some other specific epistemic traits. For example, Burge
holds, cogito judgments are self-verifying. I will return to this issue by the end of the current section.
7 Sawyer analyses the criticisms raised by Bernecker (1996), Gallois (1996) and Goldberg (2000) against
Burge’s thesis that cogito judgments are self-verifying. Failure to distinguish between cogito and non-cogito
judgments like (2) and (3) seems to be pervasive in such criticisms.
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what such expressionsmean in his case (butwithout introspecting on his feelings), Paul
judges, I am thinking, again, of my pitiful life! If this is a possible case, it is a case in
which a mental occurrence is correctly self-attributed (Paul is in fact thinking of his
pitiful life), but such amental occurrence is not thought within the samemental act that
his mental self-ascription is thought. Paul’s self-ascriptive judgment is about one of
his mental occurrences. However, the judgment and its subject matter are independent
mental occurrences: they are merely simultaneously occurrent in Paul’s mind. His
mental self-ascription is not a cogito judgment.
Therefore, if someone forms the following thought in a situation analogous to
Paul’s, this person’s thought is not a cogito judgment:
(4): I judge that there will be no third world war.
Thus, even if an individual were to self-ascribe an occurrent mental state, the thought
would not be a cogito judgment if the individual were not thereby (as a result of
having the thought) in the ascribed occurrent state. As Paul’s example shows, there are
thoughts that might exhibit trait (ii)—be self-attributions of mental occurrences—but
still be composed of independent mental occurrences. Thus, a further trait is required
to identify cogito judgments. Cogito judgments:
iii. have a dual-level component: the second-order judgment and the ascribed
mental occurrence both are part of a single thought. The self-ascribed men-
tal occurrence is thought in and through the performance of the second-order
judgment.
Trait (iii) is an essential feature of cogito judgments, which distinguishes them from
other types of judgments containing self-ascription of mental occurrences. The term
‘in’ in the characterization of trait (iii) captures the relation of the first- and second-
order thoughts to each other: the first-order thought is contained in the second-order
thought. The term ‘through’ describes how first- and second-order thoughts are related
by an individual’s act of thinking—that is, an individual thinks the first-order thought
through the act of thinking the second-order one.8 Bothmental occurrences—of think-
ing and of judging that one is thinking— are part of the same mental act. In a cogito
judgment, the individual both thinks the first-order mental occurrence and judges that
she is thinking the thought in the same thought.
With trait (iii), we can distinguish between thoughts (2) and (4) more clearly. The
former thought exhibits trait (iii); the latter, however, does not. Such a difference
between the two thoughts is represented by the presence or absence of ‘[hereby]’ in
the thought’s content. However, the inclusion of ‘[hereby]’ in the thought’s content
does not mean that the individual herself employs the notion of ‘hereby’ when forming
a cogito thought. The term ‘hereby’ represents the fact that in a cogito judgment, the
subject matter and the judgment are part of the same thought.
Features (i)–(iii) identify cogito judgments as a distinctive type of thought by
describing the psychological traits of such thoughts. Cogito judgments also present
some distinctive epistemological traits, some of which are related to their psycho-




logical features. As mentioned previously, the epistemic thesis that cogito judgments
count as privileged self-knowledge is widely accepted. According to a less prevalent
but still relatively popular thesis, cogito judgments are self-verifying.9 The latter thesis
is central to Burge’s notion of cogito judgments. I will expand on it in the remainder
of this section.
Burge holds that cogito judgments are special cases of privileged self-knowledge
since they are self-verifying. However, Burge distinguishes between pure cog-
ito judgments and impure cogito judgments based on their self-verifying aspect.
According to Burge, only pure cogito judgments are logically self-verifying. Impure
cogito judgments are performatively self-verifying.10 Pure cogito judgments are self-
verifying due to their self-referential form (Burge 1988, 2011; Sawyer 2002, p.
109). Take as examples of pure cogito judgments, thought (1) and the thought,
I am thinking that writing takes time. It holds for both thoughts that:
by [their] reflexive, self-referential character, the content of the second-order
judgment is logically locked (self-referentially) onto thefirst-order contentwhich
it both contains and takes as its subject matter. (Burge 1988, pp. 659–660).
The logic and meaning of the intentional thought content requires that if the
content is thought, it is true (Burge 2011, p. 214).
Pure cogito judgments are thus infallible. ‘If one thinks a thought of that form, one
thinks a truth’ (Burge 2011, p. 208).
Impure cogito judgments are not logically self-verifying due to their form. Instead,
impure cogito judgments are performatively self-verifying (Burge 2003, p. 124). These
are cogito judgments where ‘the intentional content does not strictly entail that a
thinking of the thought [is] self-verifying, or even true’. We could conceive a case
where an individual thinks, I [hereby] judge that there will be no third world war, but
fails to judge that there will be no third world war. According to Burge, such cases
are abnormal, but are possible. Although normal occurrences of cogito judgments are
performatively self-verifying, they are not immune to error. In his words:
In cases of reflexive performatives that are not pure cogito cases—like
I hereby judge that Socrates drank some hemlock or I hereby intend to give
to Oxfam—the self-verification is not formally guaranteed merely by thinking
the thought. But their truth is guaranteed, in normal circumstances, by the clearly
understood performance of the act. (Burge 2003, pp. 135–136)
In impure cogito cases (e.g. I [hereby] judge that writing requires concentration),
the indicated lower-level mode (e.g. judgment) is not entailed to be the mode of
the content cited by the underlining. In such a cogito thought, one could judge
that one is judging the lower-level content, and be mistaken about one’s making
a judgment. […]. Such cases are pathological misuses of the cogito form of
thought. (Burge 2011, p. 208)
9 The argument of this paper takes for granted the former thesis, but is neutral with respect to the latter.
10 According to Burge, cogito judgments have other epistemic characteristics such as being known in a
non-inferential and non-empirical way.
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The thesis that cogito judgments are self-verifying, either logically or performatively,
has been challenged during the compatibilist debate (see Gallois 1996; Bernecker
1996 and Goldberg 2000). Even so, nowadays many philosophers of self-knowledge
seem to accept such a thesis.11 In any case, what matters for this paper’s arguments
is the idea that cogito judgments are a particular class of mental self-ascriptions that
present certain specific psychological features and are epistemically special. So, for
my purposes, Burge’s distinction between pure and impure cogito judgments can be
understood in a schematic way as follows:
In pure cogito judgments, there is no specification of the type of mental occur-
rence that is the judgment’s subject matter. Neither thought (1) nor the thought,
I am thinking that writing takes time, specifies the type of mental occurrence its
thinker is in. In contrast, an impure cogito judgment specifies a mode of thinking
as part of that judgment’s content. In thinking thought (2), the individual self-ascribes
a judgment. But an impure cogito judgment could be about any other type of men-
tal occurrence. Although cogito judgments concern present mental occurrences, such
occurrences themselves need not be judgments (Burge 1996, 2003). The following is
another example of an impure cogito judgment:
(5) I [hereby] intend to go to the opera tonight.
This paper takes pure cogito judgment (1) and impure cogito judgments (2) and (5)
as its primary working examples. Any unified model of self-knowledge that aims to
explain privileged self-knowledge should be able to explain how an individual has
the privileged self-knowledge expressed by these three thoughts.12 I turn next to the
question of whether a transparency model of self-knowledge can explain how cogito
judgments (1), (2), and (5) stand as privileged self-knowledge by examining whether
such thoughts can be generated by the transparency procedure.
3 Transparency models of self-knowledge
Transparencymodels are based onEvans’ (1982) remarks on self-knowledge, as exem-
plified by the following much-cited passage:
I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by
putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question
11 See Sawyer (2002) for a defense of the thesis.
12 It could be argued that transparency models do not aim to give a unified explanation of privileged self-
knowledge. Thus, apparently, such models would not be required to explain how cogito judgments count
as cases of privileged self-knowledge. In fact, many of those who endorse the transparency model limit
the application of that model to propositional attitudes—-and often, only to specific types of propositional
attitudes. For example, Moran (2001, p. 10) holds that self-knowledge of sensations raises issues quite
different from self-knowledge of other various kinds of attitudes. However, cogito judgments are relevantly
similar to some types of propositional mental self-ascriptions such as of beliefs. Compare thoughts (2) and
(3). Trait (iii) is the difference between them, but both can count as cases of privileged self-knowledge of
propositional attitudes, respectively the one of judging and the one of believing. Even if a transparency
model does not hold a unified explanation of self-knowledge, it is expected that the model would be able to
handle both cases. The research question of the paper (i.e., whether transparency models can explain cases
of cogito judgments) is in any case still relevant for investigating the explanatory limits of transparency
models. See final section ‘Concluding Remarks’.
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whether p. […] If a judging subject applies this procedure [my emphasis], then
necessarily he will gain knowledge of one of his own mental states (Evans 1982,
p. 225).
According to the mentioned procedure for gaining self-knowledge, one answers the
question of whether one believes that p by answering the question, whether p. This
procedure has been called the ‘transparency procedure’ (Byrne 2005, 2011a). Alterna-
tively, the condition met by the procedure has been called ‘the transparency condition’
(Moran 2001).13 A transparency model is built on the idea that there is an epistemi-
cally relevant relationship between the two questions and corresponding answers that
compose the transparency procedure. The application of the transparency procedure,
it is argued, yields self-knowledge.
Evans (1982) has explicitly given a very brief treatment of self-knowledge;
he has not pursued a model based on transparency. However, many inspired by
Evans—e.g., Moran (2001), Byrne (2005, 2011a), Boyle (2011), Fernández (2003,
2013), and others—have formulated proper models of self-knowledge. In what fol-
lows, I first explain Byrne’s transparency model and raise the first set of criticisms
against it. After that, I discuss my main and general criticism of transparency
models: namely, that the transparency procedure does not generate cogito judg-
ments.
3.1 Byrne’s model and the first set of criticisms
Cassam (2015) suggests that themost natural and reasonable interpretation of the trans-
parency procedure is one according to which its application generates indirect mental
self-ascriptions. The transparency procedure regards a relation between answers to
two different questions: a question about p and a question about whether one believes
that p. Thus, it is natural to think that the transparency procedure encompasses a
transition between an answer to the former question and an answer to the latter. If
this is so, then applying the procedure generates indirect self-knowledge—and it is
reasonable to suppose that the aforementioned transition is inferential. In Cassam’s
words:
How can the self-knowledge acquired by putting into operation a procedure for
answering a different question be anything other than indirect? There must be
some kind of transition from answering the question whether p to answering
the question whether you believe that p, but knowledge that is genuinely direct
would involve no such mental transition. (Cassam 2015, p. 4)
Cassam (2014, 2015), who does not defend transparency models, holds that a lot of
self-knowledge is indirect and inferential.What is puzzling, he seems to suggest, is the
insistence that, nevertheless, a transparency model can generate direct, non-inferential
self-knowledge.
13 Throughout the paper, I will only use the term ‘transparency procedure’ to refer to this type of procedure,
or process, of forming epistemically privileged mental self-ascriptions.
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However, though Byrne (2005, 2011a) supports a transparency model, he is not
committed to such a puzzling position.14 According toByrne (2011a), the transparency
procedure consists in inferential reasoning from a premise about the world to facts
about one’s own mind. In reference to Evans’ famous example, Byrne suggests that
an individual is able to self-ascribe the belief that there is not going to be a third world
war via an inference from his own judgment that there is not going to be a third world
war. Byrne specifies this procedure in terms of the ‘doxastic schema’ (2011a), a rule
that we apply to gain self-knowledge:15
According to Byrne, following the doxastic schema yields self-knowledge because
the inference involved in the schema has certain qualities that warrant its conclusion.
He defends the doxastic schema as strongly self-verifying: ‘if one reasons in accor-
dance with the doxastic schema, and infers that one believes that p from the premise
that p, then one’s second-order belief is true, because inference from a premise entails
belief in that premise’ (Byrne 2011a, p. 206).
The special characteristics of the doxastic schema, according to Byrne, explain
privileged access and peculiar access, two key elements to be explained by models
of self-knowledge, cf. Byrne (2011a, p. 202). Byrne characterizes privileged access
as the higher probability that first-personal beliefs have to amount to knowledge in
comparison to beliefs about others’ mental states. If the doxastic schema is strongly
self-verifying, its application has a high probability of generating knowledge.Peculiar
access, according to Byrne, refers to the difference between the methods used to
gain self-knowledge and those used to gain knowledge of other people’s minds. The
doxastic schema only works in the first-person case: ‘Inferring that André believes
that p from the premise that p will often lead one astray’ (Byrne 2011a, p. 207).
Several criticisms have been raised in response to Byrne’s model. Many of these
criticisms target the quality of the inference employed in the doxastic schema. For
example, Boyle (2011) points out that this inference is neither deductively valid nor
inductively strong.Valaris (2011) objects that, in contrast to any other rule of inference,
the doxastic schema’s inference cannot be deployed in hypothetical reasoning. In
hypothetical reasoning, the individual need not believe in the premise in order to draw
an inference. The individual only needs to suppose the premise to be true. However,
the doxastic schema only works if the individual believes in the premise.16
14 Cassam (2015) criticizes Byrne on a different basis. Like Byrne, Cassam holds that self-knowledge is
acquired inferentially; however, Cassam holds that the transparency model is constructed upon the wrong
inference.
15 In an earlier work, Byrne formulates the doxastic schema in terms of the following rule for self-ascribing
beliefs: BEL: If p, believe that you believe that p (Byrne 2005, p. 95).
16 A similar point could be made concerning reductio arguments in which inference from a premise clearly
does not entail belief in that premise. Only an inference from believed premises entails belief in the premise.
Cassam (2015) raises some similar objections. In response, Byrne could insist that the doxastic schema takes
place under special circumstances, and under such circumstances the inference is guaranteed to produce
beliefs that are true. However, such circumstances are not specified in the schema. Setiya (2012) suggests
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My first criticism of transparencymodels does not target the quality of the inference
involved in the transparency procedure as conceived by Byrne. Instead, my criticism
targets the very fact that the transparency procedure generates indirect or inferential
self-knowledge. According to Burge, cogito judgments amount to non-inferential self-
knowledge.They are non-inferentially formedand their epistemicwarrant does not rely
on inferences. Thus, givenByrne’smodel (and possible variants of it), the transparency
procedure cannot explain how an individual forms cogito judgments. In what follows,
I expand on this argument. I refer to models that are based on transparency and that
hold that a belief self-ascription involves an inference from the individual’s take on p
as ‘Byrne-like transparency models’.
Trait (iii) is a distinctive aspect of cogito judgments (see Sect. 2).Cogito judgments
are self-reflexive and have a dual-level component, in that the individual thinks thefirst-
order mental occurrence in and through judging that she does so. According to Burge,
this psychological aspect of cogito judgments suffices to make the self-ascription a
non-inferential one, at both etiological and epistemic levels. Burge says:
The structure of these judgments [pure and impure cogito judgments] shows
clearly that they are not inferential.When I judge I am thinking, or I [hereby] judge
that Brahms is greater than Chabier, or I intend to take the metro, the judgment
is reflective in a way that precludes individual-level inference. The judgment
about the psychological state has, as a constituent part, the psychological state
instance that the judgment is about. Judgment and subject matter are part of a
single thought. (Burge 2011, p. 184).
According to Burge, the dual-level component aspect of cogito judgments evinces that
the thought has not been inferentially formed. Since the first-order level thought—
e.g., thinking or judging that p—is thought through its self-ascription, the first-order
thought could not be used by the person as evidence, in an inferential reasoning, to
conclude that she is thinking so. This is the reason why Burge says that the reflective
aspect of a cogito judgment precludes individual-level inference.17 In cases of cogito
judgments, the individual does not first grasp that she is thinking, and then conclude
that she is in such a mental state. Nor does the person think the first-order thought,
and then judge that she is thinking such a thought. Both thoughts are part of the same
mental act.
According to Burge, a cogito judgment is not inferentially warranted either. As
briefly discussed in Section (2), Burge holds that cogito judgments are self-verifying.
If someone thinks a pure cogito judgment, she thinks a truth. In cases of impure
cogito judgments, there is some room for mistakes, if only very little (namely, only in
cases of psychological abnormalities). Being self-verifying is arguably one epistemic
Footnote 16 continued
that Byrne’s doxastic schema does not need to be understood in terms of an inference. Instead, it could be
understood in terms of a different type of epistemic rule. Setiya claims that Byrne’s previous work (2005)
supports that interpretation. However, Byrne himself talks in terms of inferential reasoning in his later work
(2011a).
17 In arguing that cogito judgments do not involve any individual-level inference, Burge (2011, p. 184)
does not deny that some ‘unconscious psychological causal processes’ connect second-order judgments
about one’s mental occurrences and the first-order level mental occurrences.
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aspect of cogito judgments due to their psychological form. Thus the nature of cogito
judgments shows that they stand as non-inferential self-knowledge (whatever one’s
epistemic explanation of this type of warrant might be).18
Byrne-like transparency models generate inferential mental self-ascriptions that
allegedly stand as self-knowledge. The mental self-ascriptions generated by the appli-
cation of the transparency procedure are inferences from a premise about theworld to a
conclusion about one’s mind. However, the traits that identify the type of thought cor-
respondent to a cogito judgment also imply that a cogito judgment is non-inferentially
formed or warranted. Thus, Byrne-like transparency models cannot explain privileged
instances of cogito judgments. And if Cassam’s suggestion is accurate—if the only
reasonable way to make sense of the transparency procedure is by understanding it as
generating indirect, inferential self-ascriptions—then the only conclusion is that trans-
parency models in general cannot explain how cogito judgments stand as instances of
privileged self-knowledge.
One way to reply to the above argument is by resisting Cassam’s suggestion (even
if one accepts that Byrne’s model cannot explain how cogito judgments count as privi-
leged self-knowledge). As amatter of fact, there aremodels of transparency intended to
be non-inferential. Thus, the previous argument does not seem to hold as a general crit-
icism of the explanatory power of transparency models regarding cogito judgments.19
Pace Cassam, one could insist that the application of the transparency procedure does
not generate inferential self-knowledge. Works by Moran (2001), Boyle (2011), and
Fernández (2003, 2013) advance this conception of the transparency procedure.
Moran (2001), for example, advances a non-inferentialist picture of self-knowledge
that incorporates transparency. He suggests that, ‘a statement of one’s belief about X is
said to obey the Transparency Condition when the statement is made by consideration
of the facts about X itself’ (Moran 2001, p. 101). Moran holds that such a condition
relates to self-knowledge because in considering the reasons for X, onemakes up one’s
mind about X. Deliberation is a central element in Moran’s view of self-knowledge.
Moran does not explicitly specify the nature of the transition between the two answers
that compose the transparency procedure. But his proposed idea suggests that in delib-
erating whether p, and thereby making up one’s mind about p, one gains knowledge
of one’s own thoughts regarding p.20
Given the existence of models that, like Moran’s, aim to be non-inferential, the
argument presented above cannot conclusively settle the question driving this paper:
18 Burge’s explanation is roughly the following: ‘Pure cogito thinkings arewarranted through self-evidence.
Individuals are warranted by understanding their thinkings. Such warrants yield immunity to any error.
Warrant for impure cogito judgments lies in de re understanding. Understanding coordinates the lower level
performative act with the higher-level cogito judgment. Impure cogito judgments are not immune to error.’
(Burge 2011, p. 210).
19 Another possible reply to the argument above would be to resist Burge’s suggestion that the very form
of cogito judgments precludes that they are inferentially formed. I do not think this alternative is plausible,
even if it is possible. However, mymain argument developed in the next section does not depend on blocking
this possibility.
20 As highlighted by O’Brien, although Moran provides some insightful ideas on self-knowledge, he does
not seem to be explicit on the exact nature of his epistemic model. O’Brien (2003) suggests that the basis
of Moran’s explanation is the ‘non-conceptual practical awareness manifest in the subject’s capacity to be
led by reasons to judgment’ (O’Brien 2003, p. 381).
123
Synthese
namely, whether a transparency account of self-knowledge can explain how cog-
ito judgments amount to privileged self-knowledge. In what follows, I turn to a
general criticism of the transparency model that targets both inferentialist and non-
inferentialist interpretations of the transparency procedure. My criticism targets the
idea shared by any transparencymodel: the idea that we self-ascribe a belief whether p
by answering the question whether p. I argue that the application of the transparency
procedure does not generate thoughts with the dual-level component trait (iii), and
thus, does not generate cogito judgments.
4 Second set of criticisms
The core idea shared by any transparency model of self-knowledge is that privileged
self-knowledge is achieved, or formed, by the application of the transparency proce-
dure. The procedure says thatwe answer the questionwhetherwebelieve that p(i.e., we
self-ascribe beliefs) by answering the question whether p. Applying such a procedure,
it is claimed, yields privileged self-knowledge. Let me first raise a series of worries
for transparency accounts regarding their capability to generate cogito judgments via
such a procedure.
One immediate difficulty for transparency models to generate a cogito judgment
is that the transparency procedure traditionally concerns self-ascription of standing
beliefs.21 However, as discussed in Sect. 2, cogito judgments concern mental occur-
rences. Thoughts of the form (3) I believe that there will be no third world war are not
cogito judgments. A cogito judgment needs to be about an occurrent mental thought:
e.g., (2) I [hereby] judge that there will be no third world war. Thus, in its original
form, the transparency procedure cannot generate cogito judgments—including the
working examples (1), (2) or (5)—since each of them self-ascribesmental occurrences.
One could reply, however, that the transparency procedure can be easily modified to
account for the self-attribution of occurrent mental states, like judgments, as well as of
standing beliefs.22 For example, one modified version of the transparency procedure
might take the following form: we answer the question whether we judge whether
p by answering the question whether p. In fact, some criticisms of the transparency
procedure seem to support this kind of alternative. Such criticisms suggest that in
answering the question whether p, one judges whether p; thus, when applying the
transparency procedure, the individual does not gain knowledge of a standing belief
(a belief that perhaps the individual wanted to know about in the first place). Rather,
21 This understanding of the transparency procedure is based on Evans’ original formulation (1982).
However, some authors who support transparency models do not conceive beliefs as standing states. For
example, Boyle (2009) conceives beliefs as mental ‘acts or activity’. I thank an anonymous reviewer for
raising this point. Thus, the difficulty of explaining cogito judgments formulated in the above paragraph
does not apply to such models. However, I raise further criticisms that do apply to such models. In the
following paragraph, I formulate a criticism of the transparency procedure involving the self-ascription of
occurrent thoughts. Arguably, this criticism could also apply to models that understand beliefs as occurrent
thoughts. Additionally, my general criticism of transparency formulated towards the end of this section
is independent of one’s conception of beliefs as standing states, occurrent thoughts, or enduring acts. See
footnote 26 for more on Boyle’s interpretation of the transparency procedure.
22 See Byrne (2011b).
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she gains knowledge of a newly formed state—a judgment, for example (see Gertler
2011b;Lawlor 2003).One could, thus, insist that if the transparencyprocedure explains
anything at all, it only explains the kind of self-knowledge involved in self-ascription
of judgments. And this is sufficient to generate self-knowledge involved in cogito
judgments.
However, such a modification of the transparency procedure is insufficient to
explain the formation of cogito judgments. Self-ascription of a judgment is suffi-
cient only to generate thoughts like (4) I judge that there will be no third world war.
However, if (4) does not have a dual-level component, then thought (4) is not a cog-
ito judgment. (I explored the difference between thoughts (2) and (4) in Sect. 2.)23
Moreover, a cogito judgment does not merely involve self-ascription of an occurrent
judgment. Self-ascription of a judgment is necessary to generate thoughts like (2)
I [hereby] judge that there will be no third world war, but it is not necessary to gener-
ate thoughts like (1) and (5).
Cogito judgments can be about many different types of mental occurrences. Thus,
as discussed, themodification of the transparency procedure in terms of self-ascription
of judgments clearly does not generate cogito judgments about other types of mental
occurrences. Still, one could insist, furthermodifications of the transparency procedure
are possible in order to generate more diverse kinds of thoughts. Before I turn to my
general criticism of transparency, I briefly discuss some further worries related to such
a maneuver. For that, let us recall the three working examples of cogito judgments:
(1) I am thinking.
(2) I [hereby] judge that there will be no third world war.
(5) I [hereby] intend to go to the opera tonight.
Consider thought (5). In order to generate such a thought, the transparency proce-
dure would need to be such that it could prescribe the self-ascription of an intention
merely via consideration of the intention’s subject matter. However, it is unclear how
one could successfully do this. It is unclear what kinds of considerations about the
intentions’ subject matter—other than intending to φ itself—could possibly generate
a corresponding intention that is then self-ascribed by the individual.
One might insist that considerations on the desirability of doing p constitute a good
candidate for reformulating the transparency procedure regarding intentions.However,
deciding whether a given course of action is desirable does not clearly generate an
intention towards p. Deliberating whether it is desirable to take a break now does not
need to generate an intention to take a break now. Thus, settling this issue would not
shed any light on whether I intend to take a break now, since it is possible that no
intention has been formed in the first place. Although not impossible, modifications to
the transparency procedure do not seem to apply very well to self-knowledge involved
in cogito judgments about occurrent intentions.
Next, consider thought (1). A possible modification to the transparency procedure
in order for it to generate the mental self-ascription involved in (1) might have the
following form: we answer the question whether we are thinking by answering the
23 This is not to say that the application of the transparency procedure generates thoughts like the one that
Paul has, in which he knows what he is thinking by reasoning about his appearance.
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question whether p.24 Such a procedure might generate self-knowledge; an individ-
ual who is answering the question whether p is thinking. However, this is a rare and
unlikely version of the procedure: after all, our knowledge of our mental activity is
more fine-grained than merely knowing that we are thinking when we are carrying
on different mental activities. Furthermore, it is not obvious that the generated self-
ascriptions are in fact cogito judgments. In what follows, I raise my general criticism
and argue that such self-ascriptions are not examples of cogito judgments. The appli-
cation of the transparency procedure, independent of its various versions, does not
clearly generate thoughts with a dual-level component feature.
A cogito judgment is a thought that the individual thinks in the following way:
she thinks the ascribed thought (e.g., an occurrent judgment, an occurrent intention,
or the mere activity of thinking) in and through judging that she does so. This is a
specific aspect of cogito judgments captured by trait (iii). The transparency procedure,
however, does not predict that the thought produced by the application of the procedure
has such a characteristic, nor does the procedure seem to have resources to do it.
In Sect. 3.1, based on Cassam’s observations, it was suggested that the most plau-
sible understanding of the transparency procedure is the one that conceives it as
generating indirect, inferential mental self-ascriptions. However, if this is so, such
a mental self-ascription is not a cogito judgment (see also Sect. 3.1). The form of a
cogito judgment precludes it from being inferentially formed. The self-reflexive char-
acter of a cogito judgment, captured by trait (iii), precludes individual-level inference.
The individual thinks the first-order thought by performing the judgment about that
thought.25 In contrast, the inferential reading of the transparency procedure seems to
suggest that an individual first thinks the first-order thought and only later ascribes that
thought to herself. However, in a cogito judgment, the individual thinks both thoughts
in the same mental act. The inferentialist version of the transparency procedure fails
to produce cogito judgments.
On the non-inferentialist version of the transparency procedure, the generated men-
tal self-ascription does not seem to present trait (iii) either. The application of the
transparency procedure seems to indicate that in self-ascribing a given mental predi-
cate, the individual thinks only about the subject matter of her first-order thought. If
there is no transition between the two answers involved in the transparency procedure,
the individual thinks about p when self-ascribing mental state S.26 But thinking only
24 Byrne (2011b) formulates the alternative rule THINK (i.e., ‘If the inner voice speaks about x , believe that
you are thinking about x ′) in his attempt to explain privileged self-knowledge about what one is thinking.
His main examples of THINK are, however, examples of passing thoughts, not of cogito judgments (i.e, ‘I
am thinking’ is the conclusion of an inferential reasoning that takes a passing thought as evidence). Never-
theless, in any case, since THINK generates indirect, inferential knowledge, this version of the transparency
procedure would also be subject to the kind of criticism advanced in Sect. 3.1.
25 Additionally, granted that the psychological form of cogito judgments makes them self-verifying, that
same form also precludes them from being inferentially warranted.
26 This reading seems to be compatible with Boyle’s (2011) non-inferentialist interpretation of the trans-
parency procedure which is based on the idea that ‘being in a given mental state M and believing oneself to
be in M’ are not two distinct psychological conditions, but rather ‘two aspects of one cognitive state – the
state, as we might put it, of knowingly believing p′(2011, p. 228). An alternative interpretation of Boyle’s




about the subject matter of one’s ascribed thoughts (i.e., only thinking about p) is
insufficient for a thought to be a cogito judgment. A cogito judgment is a thought that
involves thinking also about the self-ascribed mental occurrence.27
This interpretation of the type of thought generated by the application of the trans-
parency procedure, if understood non-inferentially, seems to be in line with Evans’
remarks. When Evans briefly discusses self-knowledge, his main motivation is to
conceive an alternate picture of self-knowledge to the so-called Cartesian picture.
He explicitly aims to avoid the inner observation picture of self-knowledge. He then
suggests that, ‘in making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or
occasionally literally, directed outward—upon the world’ (Evans 1982, p. 225). This
much-cited passage has fed many intuitions underlying transparency models.
However, ‘directing one’s eyes outward’ does not seem to be enough to give us the
type of thoughts that consist in cogito judgments. Cogito judgments require that the
individual’s eyes are, so to speak, directed both outwards and inwards simultaneously.
In a cogito judgment, one not only thinks the thought that is ascribed; one also thinks
the very self-ascription. In this sense, in the attempt to avoid the inner observation view
of self-knowledge, Evans has apparently left us without resources to understand cogito
judgments. Denying that knowing one’s own thoughts is a type of inner perception
does not require the denial that one can direct one’s eyes inwards. This is so precisely
because one can conceive self-knowledge outside the (inner-outer) sensory approach
to self-knowledge. Directing one’s eyes inwards or outwards is just a metaphor. But if
one wants to insist on the metaphor, one needs to appeal to both inward and outward
directions in order to accommodate the dual-level component presented by cogito
judgments. Non-perceptual models of self-knowledge can be compatible with the idea
that we can form cogito judgments and that they stand as privileged self-knowledge.28
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has argued that transparency models of self-knowledge cannot explain how
cogito judgments stand as instances of privileged self-knowledge. Transparency mod-
els predict that mental self-ascriptions that amount to privileged self-knowledge are
produced by the application of the transparency procedure. However, the transparency
procedure cannot generate cogito judgments. On an inferentialist understanding of
transparency, mental self-ascriptions are inferentially generated. However, the form
of cogito judgments precludes them from being inferential. Moreover, the inferential
model seems to predict that the individual first thinks the first-order level thought
and only later thinks the self-ascription, which does not match the dual-level compo-
27 Perhaps one would like to say that the transparency procedure, in its non-inferential reading, predicts
that one self-ascribes a givenmental state (and thereby has self-knowledge) in and through thinking about p.
But to think something in a thought means that what is thought is part of the thought content. Thus, strictly
speaking, a mental self-ascription cannot be a component of the first-order mental state that is ascribed.
Self-ascribing the thought that p in thinking that p can only mean that the produced thought is about p.
However, again, a cogito judgment is a judgment in which one thinks about p in and through thinking that
one thinks about p.
28 Burge (2011) is one example of such a position.
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nent feature of cogito judgments. On the other hand, in a non-inferentialist picture of
transparency, the transparency procedure does not seem to generate thoughts with a
dual-level component either. In self-ascribing a mental state via the application of the
transparency procedure, the individual thinks only the ascribed state. However, it is
part of what identifies cogito judgments that they have a dual-level component. In a
cogito judgment, the individual thinks the first-order thought in and through thinking
that she thinks the ascribed thought.
The conclusion of this paper’s argument raises a criticism of transparency models
of self-knowledge that targets their explanatory power. It concludes that such mod-
els cannot explain the formation of cogito judgments, and thus cannot explain one
particular class of privileged self-knowledge. One might raise doubts, however, about
the importance of such results. One might insist that this conclusion is too narrow to
deserve attention: cogito judgments just add to the long list of mental states that do not
succumb to transparency, which is not particularly surprising. One might even insist
that transparency theorists would emphasize that they did not intend their theory to
cover all self-knowledge. Thus, it should not be a problem that cogito judgments are
excluded from their models.
Such attempts to resist the results achieved by this work, however, are misguided.
On the one hand, showing the explanatory limits of a given model is a relevant result,
nomatter if themodel has other limitations that have already been pointed out. If trans-
parencymodels are unable to explain the self-knowledge involved in cogito judgments,
this result per se deserves attention. Such models are still very influential. On the other
hand, if one insists on the idea that transparency models have never intended to give a
unified model of self-knowledge that includes cogito judgments (see ft. 12), then we
should be provided with some evidence that this is in fact the case. However, there
is no explicit delimitation of transparency models in relation to cogito judgments.
Furthermore, there are some transparency models, which do aim at a broad explana-
tion of self-knowledge such as the models developed by Byrne (2005, 2011a, b) and
Fernández (2003, 2013).
Additionally, there is an independent (and perhaps stronger) reason to include cogito
judgments within the items to be explained within our theories of self-knowledge. As I
mentioned earlier, cogito judgments are accepted to be paradigmatic cases of privileged
self-knowledge.29 Moreover, for many philosophers, understanding the type of self-
knowledge involved in cogito judgments is crucial for our understanding of the general
phenomenonof self-knowledge.Descartes,whose reflectionswere basedon the cogito,
is among such philosophers. Burge is another example. According to Burge (2013),
understanding the traits of cogito judgments and the cognitive capacities required for
and employed in the formation of such judgments is part of the general explanation of
our capacity for self-knowledge. This picture is reflected in Burge’s earlier writings
when he calls this class of judgments ‘basic self-knowledge’. And more recently, it is
elaborated as follows:
29 There is little disagreement on the fact that they represent a small class of privileged self-knowledge,
but being a small class does not imply that they are unimportant.
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Although cogito cases are very special cases, they contain, in germ, many of
the key features that are central to and constitutive of all types of authoritative
self-knowledge. Cogito instances are special and peculiar in their self-evidence,
self-justification, and self-verification. But they point beyond themselves in other
respects: their non-inferential immediacy; their first-person character; their use
of canonical specification of contents that requires understanding of the referred-
to contents as well as the specification; their use of a betokening understanding
of the attitude mode; their reliance on inter-level representational relations that
are routes for preserving warrant; their immunity to brute error; their being
warranted through understanding. (Burge 2013, p. 25).
This paper concludes that transparency models of self-knowledge do not have the
resources to explain how we have basic self-knowledge, to employ Burge’s terminol-
ogy. It thus raises some serious doubts as to whether transparency models can survive
without being able to explain such a paradigmatic class of self-knowledge.
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